

SPECIFIC STEPS TAKEN TO ISOLATE AND WEAKEN THE CASTRO REGIME

United States Action Against Cuba

The specific U.S. objective is to isolate and weaken the present Cuban regime with a view to its replacement by a government which shares the principles and institutions of this hemisphere. During the past two years, the United States has taken a number of steps which contribute to this objective.

The Cuban regime finds itself today increasingly cut off from the company of free men, its economy crumbling, its people restive, and its pledges for freedom and plenty long discarded.

I. Economic Measures

Total United States-Cuban trade in 1958 totaled more than \$1 billion dollars. Total United States-Cuban trade in 1962 is expected to be less than \$1 million -- almost all in exports of United States foods and medical supplies to Cuba, sanctioned for humanitarian reasons.

This reduction of trade to less than one-thousandth of its former value was taken by a series of measures after the United States established that the Cuban government had destroyed both the Cuban people and its own promises for social and economic justice and that this country was faced with a hostile regime which was aligned with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

This first step was taken in July 1960, when the United States prohibited the further importation of Cuban sugar into the United States. In October 1960, this Government prohibited the further export of United States goods to Cuba. An exception on humanitarian grounds was made for the export of certain foods and medicines. The Cuban regime had earlier begun to shift its foreign trade to the Sino Soviet bloc. The prohibition on exports deprived the regime of the manufactured items and spare parts necessary to maintain its "made in the USA" industry.

In February 1962, the President proclaimed an embargo on U.S. trade with Cuba. The export of certain foods and medical supplies was again excepted. The embargo reduced to a trickle the trade which had previously bound the two countries. For example, in May U.S. exports totaled \$35,000.

The President acted under the authority of Section 620 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. He acted in accordance with the decisions of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics who met at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962, to discuss the Cuban problem. This Government imposed the embargo to deprive the Cuban regime of the dollars which it had been earning from its sale of products in this country.

Subsequent amendments to the embargo were taken in March and May. They prohibited the importation of goods containing Cuban products into the United States from any country. The prohibition extended even to the bringing of these products into the United States by American tourists returning from abroad. A number of supplementary measures have also been taken.

Aid Bill Restrictions

Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides that no assistance under the Act shall be given to any country which "furnishes assistance to the present government of Cuba unless the President determines that such assistance is in the national interest of the United States." Section 620(a) is substantially the same as Section 110 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1961 and Section 109 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Act, 1962. The United States has transmitted this information to appropriate foreign governments.

Bunkering in U.S. Ports

Since May of 1962 this Government has denied bunkers in U.S. ports to all vessels under charter to the Sino-Soviet bloc for the carriage of cargoes between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc. Prior to that time the U.S. had, as part of its policy of full economic measures against Communist China, denied bunkering facilities to all vessels under Communist Chinese charter including those engaged in trade with Cuba. On August 9, 1962 Commerce regulations were amended to prevent Cuban owned or chartered vessels from obtaining bunkers and all ships stores. Bunker products include fuels and lubricants; ships stores include all other provisions and operating supplies.

Amendment of Transportation Order T-1

The Department of Commerce transportation Order T-1 was amended September 1962, to prohibit vessels and aircraft registered in the U.S. from transporting to Cuba commodities on the U.S. Positive List, the U.S. Munitions List or controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission. This amendment will also affect about 360 foreign flag vessels whose owners have contractually agreed not to violate the transportation order.

II. POLITICAL MEASURES

The United States has long recognized the threat which the present Cuban régime poses to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Its concern had not always been shared in the past by the other members of the Organization of American States.

The declaration by Fidel Castro in December, 1961, that he was a Communist broke the spell that he had cast over many sectors of Latin Americans. The other American Republics began to realize that the Cuban regime was a tool of the Sino-Soviet bloc in a conspiracy to subvert the free governments of Latin America.

The Punta del Este Meeting

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The Foreign Ministers of the OAS met together in Punta del Este during ~~May~~, 1962, and made a number of decisions which resulted in the isolation of the Cuban regime from the inter-American system. They clearly identified the danger of Castro/Communism to the hemisphere. They declared that the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba was incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system, and they excluded the Cuban regime from the Nato system. They suspended trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war and charged the Council of the OAS to study further trade restrictions. They excluded the Cuban regime from the Inter-American Defense Board, and urged member states to take steps to individually and collectively defend themselves against subversion.

The Special Consultative Committee on Security

The Council of the OAS subsequently established a Special Consultative Committee on Security as a body of experts to advise member government on how to fight communism. The Committee submitted an Initial General Report in May describing the Communist objectives and methods of operation in this hemisphere and recommending measures to counter their subversive activities.

The Committee now has before it specific proposals to deal with communist aggression.

The Special Committee on Trade

The Council of the OAS has also established a special Committee to study the future suspension of hemispheric trade with Cuba. The Committee is expected to take up proposals restricting hemispheric trade with Cuba.

III. The Meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers

The Secretary of State will meet informally in early October with Latin American Foreign Ministers, who are attending the General Assembly of the United Nations. Cuba will undoubtedly be among the subjects discussed by the Foreign Ministers, and the possible course of the hemispheric response to the increased Soviet involvement in Cuba may be charted at the informal meeting.

IV. The Alliance for Progress

Justifiable concern about Cuba should not divert Americans from this country's task of attacking the sources of the communist appeal in Latin America--poverty, hunger and ignorance. The US, and the other American Republics have launched the Alliance for Progress as a monumental undertaking which will virtually remake the face of Latin America. This Government hopes through self-help and mutual cooperation to bring social and economic reform to the peoples of the hemisphere and to increase their standards of living. By succeeding, we will destroy the very basis for communist exploitation.

V. Action in Other Areas

The Cuban problem must be considered as part of the world-wide challenge posed by communism. This Government is dealing with Cuba as a part of this larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long bound together the inter-American system.

The United States reported to the North Atlantic Council in February about the decisions and discussion at Punta del Este. The United States asked the NATO countries to take into account in the formulation of their Cuban policies the actions taken at Punta del Este. This Government has continued to discuss the Cuban problem with NATO. It has also undertaken bilateral talks with our major allies on the many aspects of the Cuban problem.

Multilateral and bilateral talks with our allies will continue. The United States has indications that our concern about the Cuban threat is increasingly shared by these other countries and that they will unite with the United States to counter the Cuban threat.